ISLAMABAD, Pakistan – Stretching across Pakistan’s southwest border, the mineral-rich Balochistan province is Pakistan’s largest and poorest region and the site of its longest-running subnational conflict.
Relations between Balochistan and the state of Pakistan have remained unstable since Pakistan was created in August 1947 following the partition of the subcontinent following the end of colonial rule.
Recommended stories
list of 4 itemsend of list
The province officially became part of Pakistan a year later in 1948 and has since witnessed violence. The conflict has waxed and waned for decades, but has flared up again in recent years in what analysts describe as an almost unprecedented phase.
The latest escalation unfolded on January 31, when pro-independence secessionist groups carried out coordinated attacks on nearly a dozen cities in the state.
The attackers, led by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), killed more than 30 civilians and at least 18 law enforcement officers. After these attacks, security forces announced they had killed more than 150 militants during several hours of government operations.
The next day, the province’s Chief Minister Sarfraz Bugti said in a television interview that the solution to Balochistan’s woes lies in the military, not political dialogue.
But analysts say the roots of the conflict, and some of the factors that keep it alive, lie in the final years of British rule in South Asia and the uncertain political geography that preceded Pakistan’s independence.
Accession to Pakistan and dissatisfaction
On the eve of partition, Balochistan was not a single political unit. Part of the region was directly ruled by the British as “Chief Balochistan,” while the rest of the region was made up of princely states such as Qalat, Makran, Ras Bela, and Qallan, which were linked to the British Crown through treaties rather than colonial rule.
In 1947, the Kalat Khanate was technically independent and was first recognized as such by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founder and first governor-general.
That position changed as the strategic value of Balochistan’s coastline, the gateway to the Strait of Hormuz, became clearer. Mir Ahmed Yar Khan, Khan of Qalat, agreed to accede to Pakistan on March 27, 1948.
His younger brother Abdul Karim rejected the agreement and led a small group of fighters into Afghanistan, where the first Baloch insurgency began. It ended within a few months with his surrender.
This episode was considered “forced accession” among Baloch nationalists and laid the foundations for future resistance.
A pattern soon became apparent. Political exclusion led to armed resistance, followed by a military response, followed by a period of unrest and temporary peace, a cycle that repeated itself.
cycle of rebellion
The second major uprising began in 1958 and was sparked by Pakistan’s “One Unit” plan to dissolve West Pakistan’s provincial identity into a single administrative structure.
Baloch leaders viewed the move as a violation of their autonomy and demanded the release of the arrested Mir Ahmed Yar Khan.
Nawab Nauroz Khan was a veteran tribal leader who fought against British rule and led an armed rebellion. The incident ended with his arrest and the execution of several of his colleagues after a military trial. Khan was also sentenced to death, but his sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment, and he ultimately died in prison.
The third phase, which followed in the 1960s, was driven by opposition to the military regime in the province and demands for political rights increasingly shaped by left-wing ideology, when Pakistan was ruled by the Ayub Khan government, its first military junta. Although limited, it reinforced the view that relations between Balochistan and the state were dominated by force.
The most violent conflicts erupted in the 1970s.
After the removal of Balochistan’s elected provincial government led by the National Awami Party (NAP) in 1973, a full-scale insurgency spread to large parts of the province.
NAP and its leaders were accused by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government of conspiring in London to support Pakistan’s collapse. The conspiracy was never proven.
However, party leaders, including the then Prime Minister Sardar Attaullah Mengal, were arrested. Thousands of Baloch fighters clashed with around 80,000 Pakistani troops, leaving thousands dead.
The fighting ended in 1977 after General Zia-ul-Haq seized power in a coup and granted amnesty to Baloch fighters. However, their core grievances remained unresolved.
turning point
A period of relative peace followed, but resentment persisted. Critics accused the province of exploiting Balochistan’s natural resources, including gas reserves, while local communities remained deprived.
Several incidents highlighted what Baloch groups described as heavy-handed state tactics, leading to the fifth and current insurgency that began in the early 2000s.
One flashpoint was the 2005 incident in which Shazia Khalid, a doctor working for a state-run gas company, was allegedly raped by an army captain. Pakistan was then ruled by General Pervez Musharraf, who seized power in a 1999 coup.
The incident sparked massive local protests and deadly armed clashes, but smoldering tensions exploded into a full-scale conflict in August 2006 when Nawab Akbar Bugti, the province’s former chief minister and popular Baloch tribal chief, was killed in a military operation.
Bugti’s death turned him into the most powerful symbol of Baloch resistance, sparking a surge of anger and rebellion, as well as a growing belief among many Baloch that independence was the only way forward.
In recent years, protests have increasingly been led by young, middle-class Baloch, with women playing key roles.
The country’s response has included a large security force presence and tactics criticized by rights groups.
Activists accuse the government of killing and forcibly disappearing thousands of Baloch people suspected of supporting the rebellion. Many of the missing were later found dead, often with signs of torture.
The government denies responsibility for the enforced disappearances, suggesting that most of the disappeared likely joined rebel groups in the mountains of Iran or Afghanistan, or across the border.
modern rebellion
The ongoing insurgency coincides with major changes in Pakistan’s political economy.
Large-scale natural gas extraction projects at the deep-sea port of Gwadar, mineral extraction and the launch of the $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) have transformed Balochistan into a strategic hub.
For many Baloch groups, these projects represent profitless exploitation and leave local communities marginalized.
Militant organizations such as the BLA and the Balochistan Liberation Front frame their struggle as resistance to colonial exploitation and the pursuit of “national liberation.”
Pakistan’s government has accused regional rival India of fueling troubles in the province by supporting separatists. These claims gained attention with the arrest of Kulbhushan Jadhav in Balochistan province in 2016. According to Islamabad, the suspect was an Indian intelligence officer working for the Investigation and Analysis Wing, India’s foreign intelligence agency.
Pakistan later released a video in which Jadhav confessed to facilitating the attack, presenting it as evidence of outside interference. India denied that Jadhav was a spy.
Find a solution
The 2010s saw the emergence of more sophisticated Baloch armed groups that increasingly targeted Chinese nationals and projects.
The attacks hit the Gwadar port, the city’s luxury hotels, the Chinese consulate in Karachi, and the Chinese Cultural Center, among many other incidents.
As the violence escalates, the government is also focusing on mining Balochistan’s mineral resources.
China operates a large copper mine in Saindak, and the Reko Diq project in western Balochistan province, considered one of the world’s largest undeveloped copper and gold deposits, is also underway.
In Balochistan, which covers 44 percent of Pakistan and shares borders with Iran and Afghanistan, geography poses a bigger challenge than the insurgency, said Abdul Basit, a research fellow at Singapore’s Sa Rajaratnam School of International Studies.
Balochistan’s topography is characterized by a rugged, arid mountainous landscape, and the vast space is sparsely populated, accounting for just over 6 percent of the country’s total population. The province’s mountainous regions are often used as sanctuaries by rebel groups.
“Can a province as large and difficult as Balochistan really deploy security forces to ensure a complete eradication of violence, especially if the state refuses to look at local fault lines?” he asked.
Many analysts argue that Pakistan needs to shift away from a militaristic approach.
Imtiaz Baloch, a conflict researcher in the state, says the insurgency has been handled out of ego rather than genuine efforts to ensure peace.
“Instead of addressing the fundamental issues, the government has mainly focused on shaping the narrative for an audience outside the province. Balochistan does not need emotional posturing or viewpoints. It needs a calm, political and pragmatic approach,” he said.
Sahel Baloch, a Berlin-based academic with extensive experience in the state, says political problems cannot be solved by force.
Militants know the terrain better than security forces, so occasional attacks are enough to expose a state’s vulnerabilities, she said.
“Where states govern by fear rather than trust, information also dries up. People don’t cooperate and information doesn’t flow. That’s why even high-security areas continue to be violated,” she told Al Jazeera.
Government officials continue to insist that military force is the solution, but Rafiullah Kakar “strongly disagrees” with this view.
Kakar, a political analyst specializing in Balochistan and a doctoral candidate at the University of Cambridge, said Pakistan relied on a “coercive and military approach” that had failed to bring stability.
“The Pakistani state needs to fundamentally shift and recalibrate its approach. The starting point must be meaningful confidence-building measures to create an enabling environment for political reconciliation and dialogue,” he told Al Jazeera.
He added that any serious attempt to resolve the crisis must recognize its political nature and include measures such as addressing enforced disappearances, ensuring legitimate representation in elections, and establishing a “credible truth and reconciliation commission.”
“Finally, the state must present a clear roadmap of structured dialogue and institutional mechanisms to address long-standing political, economic and governance-related grievances in Balochistan,” he said.
