Submarine cables are vulnerable to interference, but this requires skill and specialized equipment.

The country has now relied on networks of cables and pipes beneath the sea for energy and communication. So I was worried about reading the headline about the disconnected communications cable, and in some cases, the undersea gas pipeline exploded.

Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUI) These connections are known, and support trade worth around USD 9 trillion (£6.6 trillion) per day. A coordinated attack on this network can undoubtedly have catastrophic consequences.

But as a former submarine commander who studied maritime security, I believe attacking and disrupting the network is not as easy as some reports appear. While intentional hooking a pipeline with a drag anchor in relatively shallow waters can cause a lot of damage, it is a rather indiscriminate trick to shelf life as it can repair damage.

Targeting cable networks in deeper waters requires more sophisticated methods. This is much more difficult to do.

Hostile situations that want to attack this network must first find the cable you want to target. Most of the new commercial cables are charted very clearly, but their locations are not accurate.

Even the heaviest cables and pipelines drift slightly when laid, with the deeper water, the greater the distance they drift.

These new cables are often buried in shallow grooves to protect them, making them more difficult to find and access. The old cables were laid with slightly less accurate navigation times before the GPS network became available for private use. They are not untouched or predictable patterns.

The location of cables used by the military is generally not advertised at all for security reasons. Finding the target cable requires a detailed understanding of the seabed topography and features. Such pictures can only be constructed by investigation and reconnaissance.

It takes time and effort to accurately investigate the seabed. And to gain certainty about the photograph, investigation or reconnaissance operations must be carried out in duplicate rows. This is a painstaking job conditioned on the condition of the ocean.

Specialist Equipment

To identify a cable to the seabed or to a trench it lies, you need some sonar resolution in order of 1 or 2 meters, and you need specialized equipment.

In 2024, several submarine communication cables were destroyed in the Baltic Sea. There were doubts about the ship dragging the anchor and damaging the cable, but authorities were unable to confirm this. The damage is not ultimately attributable to a third party.

There was fear about “hybrid battles.” Actions that another country denied are sufficient to cause confusion, but not enough to become a cause of war.

In 2017, the chief of British defense staff said Russia poses a threat to the submarine cable. Russia has spent considerable money, time and effort developing platforms and capabilities that could target undersea infrastructure if the country were.

The organization, called the Main Bureau of Deep Sea Research (GUGI), operates a research vessel with deep nuclear submarines and deep submarines that can be operated at 6,000 meters.

Russian Navy

The Russian Navy also operates research vessels such as Academik Vladimirsky. The exact sensors equipped on the ship are unknown, but a 2012 research expedition to Antarctica deployed a proton magnetometer that could be used to discover metal objects under the sea, such as pipelines.

However, there is no suggestion that these research vessels are involved in disruptions in the undersea infrastructure. Nevertheless, such vessel operation is not observed in the West. Deployment indicators and warnings can be obtained from images, and western submarines can track and observe patrols.

The threat posed to Europe’s critical undersea infrastructure is realistic and the outcome of successful attacks can be devastating. However, this is a difficult business in a very challenging environment.

The most acute threat lies in the coastal zones (coastal zones) in shallow waters around the site of cables landing and their landing. Protecting these chokepoints must be your number one priority.

This requires the right number of attack submarines that can be monitored, and deter or disrupt hostile activities when necessary. Vigilance, investment, and realism are not vigilance, but the foundation for reliable undersea defense.

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